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A Cartography of the Unknowable: Technology, Territory
and Subterranean Agencies in Israel’s Management of the
Gaza Tunnels
Ian Slesinger
Department of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
This article evaluates the potential for agency exercised by the
subterranean volume in geopolitical conflict. Joining recent geo-
graphical conceptualisations of territory as a volumetric assem-
blage with calls for an elemental geopolitics, it argues that the
density of the underground layer creates a convoluted techno-
political problem that obfuscates the state’s means of directly
observing, visualising and knowing the topological space of terri-
tory. To illustrate this, a methodological approach based on the
relational ontologies of actor-network-theory (ANT) and assem-
blage theory is applied to an empirical study of the geophysical
sensing techniques used by Israeli engineers, scientists andmilitary
to manage cross-border tunnels built by the Palestinian militant
group Hamas before and after the 2014 Gaza war. The soil condi-
tions, settlement patterns and infrastructures in the Gaza-Western
Negev region have necessitated experimentation with complex
and multiple forms of scientific and political expertise in attempts
to locate the invisible tunnels, alongside a shift towards increas-
ingly oblique techniques of cartographic representation of the sub-
surface. The contingency of these efforts has unsettled the State of
Israel’s confidence in its ability to manage geopolitical risks
through techniques of territorial control. This case raises poignant
questions about the extent of the capacities and limitations of
technological solutions and geopolitical practices to secure terri-
tory when confronted with the geophysical agency of the
underground.
Introduction: Material Agency and Geopolitics
The elemental properties of the Earth in a particular place exert influence on
the strategic efficacy of the military, and by extension the political agency of
the state. Put differently, the materialities and processes of the physical
environment play an active role in shaping geopolitical processes (Adey
and Anderson 2011; Barry 2013a, 1–2). Shaw notes that the ‘‘relationship
between violence and the environment has persisted since the dawn of
humanity. . . all that has changed is the scale, intensity, and technical
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complexity of this relationship’’ (2016, 692). Explicating the complex entan-
glement of political organisations with the hybrid earthly–technological
volume of the space through which they operate can provide a more nuanced
understanding of the dynamics and limitations of geopolitical power enacted
through the logic of territory. This article will address how the subterranean
dimension specifically affects the complex relationship between territory,
techno-scientific risk management practices and geophysical material agency.
To do so, it will use as a case study Israel’s efforts to detect cross-border
tunnelling from Gaza by the Palestinian political party-cum-militant group
Hamas1 around the 2014 Gaza war.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) declared Operation Protective Edge on 8
July 2014 with the stated aim of halting persistent rocket fire into civilian
areas in the Negev from Hamas in Gaza (State of Israel 2015, x; UN Human
Rights Council 2015, 18). However, 10 days into the conflict the Israeli
operation’s primary objectives suddenly shifted to detecting and neutralising
a series of newly discovered clandestine attack tunnels from Gaza, which had
taken the IDF by surprise. Furthermore, this new goal necessitated a ground
incursion by IDF into Gaza, as opposed to their preferred strategy of intense
aerial bombardment demonstrated in the 2009 and 2012 Gaza wars. Such a
ground battle is a politically undesirable strategy for the appointed Israeli
security cabinet due to public casualty aversion in relation to Israel’s con-
script military.
According to Israel’s count, thirty-two cross-border tunnels were destroyed
during the conflict, eighteen of which had actually penetrated into Israeli
territory while the other fourteen were incomplete (State of Israel 2015, 47).
However, it is unclear whether all of Hamas’ cross-border tunnels were
actually discovered. Since the end of the 2014 Gaza war, Hamas has started
to build new tunnels into Israeli territory in preparation for a stand-alone
attack or use in the next round of conflict. Several tunnels have been discov-
ered and destroyed by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) between the end of the
2014 Gaza war and 2016 (Harel 2016a). The unusual and sudden circum-
stances of a state apparatus shifting the stated goals of a military operation
mid-campaign, as well as taking the politically unpopular decision to put
“boots on the ground,” begs the question of why tunnels were considered
such a severe threat as to initiate this uncharacteristic set of actions by Israel’s
political echelon?
This article argues that the tunnels are perceived as a serious threat by
Israel’s strategic decision-makers because they are a technology of occlusion
that makes use of the material properties of the earth to subvert the Israeli
state’s apparatuses of surveillance and calculation to secure against danger.
The tunnels are unpredictable vectors from which Hamas militants could
evade Israel’s strong regime of border fences, visual and communications
monitoring, and human intelligence gathering (HUMINT) to carry out
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surprise attacks within Israel. In this way, the tunnels attack the core premise
of territorial sovereignty through which the state derives and articulates its
power. The Hamas tunnels harness the elemental agency of the sub-surface
to undermine the surfical power of the state. In doing so, this tunnelling
disrupts the way that “space is ‘geo-coded’ through mapping. . . to know,
control, and govern territories” by state security agents (Crampton 2011, 94).
This undermining of cartographic representation unsettles the territorial
knowledge through which the state asserts its perceived sovereignty.
However, this materialist analysis does not imply that the Hamas tunnels, or
the conflict between Gaza and Israel is a purely technical issue. Rather, the
tunnels are problematic for Israel’s security organs due to the complex con-
vergence of politics, geopolitical organisation, socio-economic factors, mate-
rial practices and geology endemic to the Gaza-Western Negev region within
the broader context of the Israel-Palestine conflict and the turbulent geopoli-
tical circumstances of the Middle East at present. It is precisely the entangle-
ment of these converging vectors that make the problem so complicated, as
their totality transcends the capacity to deal with each aspect individually.
To explicate how a subterranean geopolitics can enhance a critical understand-
ing of the how political violence operates, this article will link the technological
management and the manipulation of territory for political ends to the spatial
production and rupturing of state sovereignty. The following sectionwill provide a
theoretical context for locating the subterranean within recent debates on the
spatialisation of state power. In doing so, it will reconcile contending positions that
have emerged in the recent literature on the volumetric nature of territory that
treat volumetric space either as a vector through which political-rational calcula-
tions are spatialised (Elden 2013a, 2013b; Graham and Hewitt 2013; Weizman,
2007), or alternately as an elemental volumemade up of a materiality that exceeds
and constrains actors’ agencies to manipulate the earthly volume (Adey 2010,
2015; Peters 2012; Squire 2016; Steinberg and Peters 2015). The methodology
section will set out how amaterialist epistemology based on actor-network-theory
(ANT) and assemblage theory provides a useful set of tools for excavating a
subterranean geopolitics, as well offering a brief discussion of the politics of
research in a conflict zone. The fourth section “‘Two Gazas’: Locating the
Tunnels in a Space of Conflict” will historicise the present case study within the
regional context and in terms of Israel’s territorial logic regarding Gaza. The two
sections that come after will form the empirical core of the article. “Subsurface
Complexity and Political Agency” attends to the ways in which local material
agencies manifest and how this frustrates scientific attempts to know the under-
ground layer. “A Cartography of the Unknowable” deals with the issue of repre-
senting the subterranean, a space whose dense volume negates the primacy of
visual perception, and its implications for the state’s ability to technologically
manage risk through data analysis. The article concludes by relating the Gaza
tunnels case study back to a broader theoretical discussion of how the
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subterranean destabilises state power by interfering with the calculative rationality
of the state, and how this alters the ways in which geopolitics can be understood.
Securing the Elemental Volume
The recent paradigm of a volumetric political geography offers a powerful means
to theorise the relationship of state-space with the physicality of the earth and
how spatialised assemblages of humans, matter and technological innovation
work to both negotiate and negate the supposedly inviolate border of the
sovereign state (Elden 2013b). Territory is not a flat surface with demarcated
and fixed boundaries. Rather, geopolitical processes are in constant flux through
the three dimensions of space, i.e. above ground, at the surface and below ground,
as well as horizontally and diagonally (Elden 2013a, 17). Arguments from the
emerging elemental geographies literature extend the concept of volumetric
geopolitics as a dynamic and full physical environment by drawing attention to
how the elemental richness and affective capacities of volumetric space can
exceed political rationality, rather than treating the maintenance of territory as
an instrumental political process. In other words, politics do not just operate
through the volume, they are “immersed” in the volume (Adey 2015, 57).
The elemental geographies literature documents how general categories of
earthly elements, such as rock, air and water have influenced sites and processes
of geopolitical significance in a way that exceeds the abstraction of a juridical
notion of territory (Adey 2010, 2015; Peters 2012; Squire 2016; Steinberg and
Peters 2015). In keeping with Boyce’s recent work on the pitfalls of the SBInet
surveillance sensor network at theUS-Mexico border, an elemental perspective can
further “a post-humanist theory of ‘terrain’” that attends to “the ways that the
quality of certain forces, spaces, and conditions may impede or disrupt a state’s
vision, navigation, or administrative practice” (2016, 246). This concept of the
political inertia ofmaterial agencies can be pushed further to add greater depth and
breadth to the political geography of terrain by focusing on the peculiarities that
constitute its subterranean aspect. Building on McCormack’s critique of the
emerging elemental thinking, more attention should be paid to “the particular
capacities and properties” of “classes of matter” (2015, 86) as they converge in a
unique location. As political geographers, we can develop evenmore sophisticated
accounts of geopolitical events by correlating the elemental notion of volumetric
space with the rational-political understanding of territory through which state
actors themselves articulate sovereignty. Considering the convergence of distinct
elemental properties with other specific aspects of a place will produce better
theorisation of the ambivalences between the sameness that make general classes
of elemental matter analogous and their place-specific localisations that generate
difference to provide more sophisticated accounts of geopolitical situations. In the
present case of the Gaza tunnels, the region’s historical trajectory alongside the
particular patterns of bordering, fortification and surveillance, have coalesced with
4 I. SLESINGER
the endemic soil conditions to challenge the state’s approach to managing security
through territorial ordering.
Such a theorisation of security as working through territorial assemblages
necessitates consideration of how security is understood and operationalised
both by practitioners and scholars. In contrast to a constructivist definition
of security as a conceptual discourse of threat identification through “speech
acts,” (eg. Waever 1998), security is treated in this article as a materialisation
of people, technologies, practices and knowledge that coalesces in response to
“some form of dangerous supplement to the present that threatens to bring
disappearance, damage or loss to a valued life (Anderson 2010, 229).
Existential security defends life through the “social technology” of risk ‘by
means of which the uncertain future, be it of a catastrophic nature, is
rendered knowable and actionable” (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van
Munster 2008, 150). By using an array of cartographic technologies including
aerial and satellite imagery in concert with a constant stream of signals
intelligence (SIGINT), HUMINT and sensor data being disseminated from
the Gaza border, the IDF is engaged in a labour regime to monitor and
anticipate any breaches of its security, rather than reacting responsively to an
emergent threat. The key importance of cartographic techniques within
military technological practices to “render space ‘visible’” underscores that
“the power of the visual always exceeds the simple matter of representation”
in a way that is “central to the ability of the state to enact geopolitical power”
(Graham 2010, 202).
In order to unpack how Israel’s techno-territorial assemblage works to
manage risk in a dialectic with Hamas’ competing assemblage working to
destabilise Israel’s territorial control, a methodological approach based on
ANT and assemblage theory is particularly useful. These two related
approaches are valuable because they explicitly deal with the co-constitutive
relationship between society, materialities and technologies in a sophisticated
way that is neither deterministic nor deconstructionist.
Methodology
The present research works from a materialist epistemology that borrows
from ANT and assemblage theory. These related, but different, approaches
treat politics as a web of socio-technical relations in which agency is dis-
tributed between humans, objects and the physical environment. The capa-
cities and relations of these actors coproduce ontology in a way that exceeds a
purely human agentive capacity. By tracing how the interaction between
humans and nonhumans, and among non-humans “creates. . . geopolitical
risks” (Ek 2000, 866), an ANT approach can lead to novel insights about how
political conflicts occur. Barry develops this notion by suggesting that scho-
lars ought to engage with the specificities of techno-scientific knowledges and
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material processes to produce more multifaceted and nuanced narratives of
political situations (2013b, 420). This methodological approach demands that
the researcher focus on the unique dynamics of the situation at hand to alter
existing theory, rather than rigidly applying a normative theory to a parti-
cular case.
Assemblage theory is a useful supplement to ANT for considering how
military groups organise in the context of their environments. It views a
political organisation as constituted by a heterogeneous network i.e. assem-
blage comprised of both human and non-human elements that can be
manipulated or interfered with to enact social or political change (De
Landa 2006). Müller argues that “critical geopolitics all too often just assumes
organisations as given actors without looking at what exactly fashions them
with agency” while in actuality “organisations are precarious entities” that
require constant work through bureaucratic processes and the enrolment of
technologies “to maintain their actorness” (2012, 379). Borrowing from
ANT’s terminology, assemblage theory provides a way to dissect the “black
box” of military organisations, to expose their composition and inner work-
ings. Incorporating the elemental properties of the physical environment
itself into the military assemblage/counter-assemblage, can explicate how
the earth is simultaneously both an agent that furthers an actor’s agenda,
and an inertial force that works against an entity’s strategic goal.
In order to explicate the relationship between the socio-technical assem-
blage of the IDF in their efforts to locate the Hamas tunnels from Gaza and
the material properties of the soil, this research has relied on a mixed method
approach that combines field research with documentary analysis. The field
research was conducted in Israel in 2016 and consisted primarily of semi-
structured elite interviews with reserve or retired military personnel, aca-
demic experts, earth scientists and engineers. An especially rich vein for this
ANT-based enquiry came from an engagement with the scientific and engi-
neering experts. They provided an explanation of the technical specificities,
capabilities and limitations of geo-physical detection that is at the core of this
argument. It is only by grappling with the physics and mathematics of
frequency ranges, magnetic fields, electrical conductivity and reflection coef-
ficients, that the material agency of soil becomes apparent.
Supplementing these “elite” perspectives are ethnographic site visits and
interviews with residents and activists in the Western Negev region bordering
Gaza. Additionally, documentary sources were used to supplement the interview
data, and to provide a wider political context for the case study. These sources
included Israeli and foreign newspapers, government reports and media out-
puts, and reports by both Israeli and foreign NGOs, IGOs and think tanks.
Unsurprisingly, conducting a military “technography” (Woolgar 1998,
441) in an arena of active conflict is fraught with sensitivities and impedi-
ments to access that must to be carefully negotiated. As a deliberate response
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to the often contentious discourse about the Israel-Palestine conflict, care has
been taken in this article to moderate against a strongly agonistic character-
isation of the Gaza case, and instead focus on its value as a medium to think
through theoretical concerns about the political significance of subterranean
materialities. However, it is important to acknowledge the deeply entangled
and mutually reinforcing “dialectics of space/violence” (Yiftachel 2009, 146)
in the conflict between multiple sets of actors that goes beyond a simple
binary of Israeli/Palestinian. I have conscientiously avoided fetishising the
subalternity of Hamas and other Palestinian militant factions to excuse their
violence, nor uncritically accept the legitimacy of the frequently draconian
violence of Israeli military action in Gaza. That said, this article does not
pretend to provide an “objective” or even-handed account of the role of
tunnels in the Gaza-Israel conflict.
The present account focuses almost exclusively on Israel’s experience with
the Gaza tunnels as an ongoing exercise of risk management. Reasons for this
include the focus of enquiry on technology and the state, and the researcher’s
own positionality within the research, which opened certain pathways of
access and participation that might have been restricted to other researchers,
whilst simultaneously making other lines of investigation problematic. Other
considerations included the sensitivity of negotiating access to elite partici-
pants in Israel, travel restrictions on entering Gaza, and the deliberate secrecy
of Hamas regarding the tactics and strategy of their tunnel-building. As a
result, Palestinian perspectives on the matter are unfortunately absent.
However, since the emphasis of this article is on how the subterranean affects
hegemonic state security, the absence of Palestinian voices in the present
research does not detract significantly from its substance or purpose.
Additional considerations included taking care to respect both legal require-
ments regarding state secrecy and participants’ personal boundaries in what
they were willing to discuss. These sensitivities necessitated avoiding the use of
audio recording in certain interviews. As a researcher, I also needed to be
aware of how my own acts of information gathering and knowledge produc-
tion could make me an active agent in the geopolitical conflict. In one instance,
I was interviewing a scientific expert about tunnel detection and asked a
question about whether different materials used by Hamas to reinforce the
tunnels made them harder to detect. At this point, the participant said he
didn’t want to answer that question because if I published that information it
could “help the enemy.” 2
“Two Gazas”: Locating the Tunnels in a Space of Conflict
The Israeli journalist Shlomi Eldar observed that the tunnels “suddenly
revealed that there are two Gazas: One is the crowded, impoverished and
faltering Gaza, but there is also an ‘underground Gaza,’ buried deep below
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the surface” (2014). This sub-surfical dimension of the Gaza situation is not
without antecedents or parallels within the broader context of the Israel-
Palestine conflict. Weizman notably describes the “bewildering and impos-
sible Escher-like territorial arrangement” created by Israel’s construction of
“underground tunnels” and “infrastructure” in the occupied West Bank as a
set of volumetric techniques to enable Israeli territorial control to occur
above- and below-ground simultaneously with Palestinian political control
on the “surface” (2007, 180). Furthermore, issues around the sovereign rights
and distribution of subterranean resources have caused significant disagree-
ments impeding a negotiated peace agreement. For some time, there have
been disputes over shared aquafers concerning water allocation by volume,
the digging and control of land for wells and pollution from agriculture and
sewage (Tal and Rabbo 2010, 103–123; Zeitoun 2008, 47–53). More recently,
the exploration and potential discoveries of fossil fuel deposits located both
off-shore between Israel and Gaza, and sites in the West Bank have become
another locus for resource conflict (Oil in Palestine 2014; Hatuqa 2014;
Schwartz 2015). However, it is necessary to look beyond geo-strategic
approaches to underground territoriality that treat the ground or what lies
within it as an inert vessel for human political power, to reappraise the
constitution of territory and its significance within the Israel-Palestine
conflict.
To understand how the subterranean mediates the existence of “two
Gazas,” at present and what makes the Gaza tunnels a “matter of concern”
for Israel (Latour 2004, 231), it is important to locate their position within
the regional geopolitical arrangements that produce Gaza as a territory.
Following this, it is necessary to provide an account of Hamas’ and other
Palestinians’ agentive roles within this space of conflict, whilst considering
the extent to which the tunnels themselves can begin to exercise their own
capacity for agency in ways that go beyond the instrumental functions
anticipated by human actors. A caveat should be noted that while this section
works to provide a historical, political and social context for the tunnels,
there will inevitably be lacunae due to the intentionally secretive nature of the
tunnelling and detection enterprises, and the impossibility of engaging with
some of the actors involved in the complex network that is responsible for
the tunnels’ construction and destruction.
The State of Israel derives its authority through a malleable application of
the Westphalian conception the state’s absolute territorial sovereignty as a
means of asserting its claim to economic resources and existential security
within and without its borders. This use of territory has historically meta-
morphosed over a series of spatial shifts starting from the 1948 Arab-Israeli
War in which The State of Israel was founded. The IDF captured the Sinai
Peninsula and Gaza from Egypt in the 1967 Six-Day War. The Sinai was
returned to Egypt in 1982 as part of what the State of Israel has coined a
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“land for peace” strategy in accordance with 1979 Begin-Sadat peace agree-
ment, although Egypt revoked its claim to Gaza. Little changed in terms of
the territorial condition of Gaza as part of the Israeli state following the
creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the rezoning of the
West Bank into areas of Palestinian, Israeli and joint control resulting from
the 1993 Oslo Accords. In response to the violence of the Second Intifada
that started in 2000, Israel began to tightly restrict the movements of
Palestinians in and out of Gaza. In 2004 the Israeli Knesset decided to
support the controversial plan of right-wing prime minister Arial Sharon to
unilaterally “disengage” from Gaza. Multiple reasons have been presented for
Israel’s decision to withdraw. These included the high costs in resources and
blood to defend the Jewish settlements in Gaza, how disavowing the pre-
dominantly Palestinian territory would alter the state’s demographic balance
in favour of a Jewish majority to preserve Israel’s “democratic character,” and
to assuage Palestinian and international criticism of Israel’s ongoing occupa-
tion of the future Palestinian state in contravention of the Oslo roadmap
(Byman 2011, 174–176). Following Israel’s completion of the withdrawal in
autumn 2005, Hamas won the majority of parliamentary seats in both the
West Bank and Gaza in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. These
results were not accepted by their rival, the secular Fatah party, leading to
a violent internal struggle within Palestine. By the end of this conflict in 2007,
the Palestinian Authority was spatially divided between the two factions, with
Fatah controlling the PNA in the West Bank and Hamas gaining full control
of Gaza.
Paradoxical to its application of the Westphalian concept of sovereignty as
the underlying source of political legitimacy, the State of Israel also extends
its de facto partial sovereignty over Gaza’s borders and atmosphere. The pre-
existing movement restrictions continued following the 2005 withdrawal,
against the backdrop of increasing Palestinian rocket attacks. Human
Rights Watch reported that approximately 2,700 rockets were fired from
Gaza into Israel between September 2005 and May 2007 (2007, 31). Since
the Hamas takeover in mid-2007, Israel and Egypt have intensified, and in
some limited circumstances de-intensified, a blockade regime against Gaza.
In doing so, Israel has maintained its application of control over Gaza’s
boundaries to counteract Hamas’ political control within the strip that
Israel perceives as a threat to its own territorial security. This partial sover-
eignty is expressed in the multiple and convoluted logics that administrate
the interior and exterior of Gaza’s territory. Hamas governs inside the
territory and is primarily responsible for aspects of routine governance like
infrastructure, policing, social welfare, tax collection, broadcast media, and
hospitals and schools. Simultaneously, Israel and Egypt both control and
limit the movement of people and goods outside of Gaza through their
respective land borders to constrain Hamas’ military capacity and to produce
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stressful socio-economic conditions to stimulate popular antipathy against
Hamas (Donnison 2010). Likewise, Israel controls Gaza’s maritime zone
through a naval blockade (Steinberg 2011, 13) that has been in continuous
operation from 2007 and maintains control of Gaza’s airspace. Gaza is also
heavily dependent on Israeli and Egyptian infrastructure for its telecommu-
nications and the importation of both generated electricity and the fuel
needed to power the enclave’s inadequate power plant, private generators
and vehicles.3
This grey area in sovereignty has led to heated debates in international law
over whether Gaza is still an occupied territory by Israel following the 2005
withdrawal. These debates have centred around the legal test of “effective
control” of an occupying power based on Regulation 42 of the 1907 Hague
Convention on the laws of war, which states that a territory is occupied
“when it is placed under the authority of the hostile army” and that the
occupying force’s authority “has been established and can be exercised”
(Dinstein 2009, 42–44). Some academics and human rights organisations
contend that the Gaza is still occupied since Israel maintains “a broad
scope of ... control in the Gaza Strip” (B’tselem 2017; Maurer 2012). An
opposing position argues that the IDF lacks the “potential” to maintain a
stable military presence inside Gaza due to Hamas’ military control of the
territory’s interior, nor does Israel control Gaza’s civil governance or legal
regime (with the caveat of the Palestinian government’s responsibility under
the Oslo Agreement to report updates to its population registry to Israel)
(Cuyckens 2016; Milanovic 2009). Ultimately, whether Gaza is still an Israeli
occupied territory is a question of scholarship in international law that is
outside the purview of this article. However, in both practical and legal terms
the Israeli state treats Gaza as a “sui generis” non-state territory that is
external to Israel due to Hamas’ internal control of the enclave (State of
Israel 2009, 11).
In contrast to the malleability of spatial boundaries in the Israeli occupa-
tion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Gaza’s terrestrial territorial
dimensions are now well-defined in map terms based on the borderline
established in the 1949 armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel.4
Following the 2005 withdrawal, Israel disavowed any claim to inhabit Gaza.
This is evidenced by the permanent moves to dismantle Jewish settlements
during the withdrawal, including burying synagogues and relocating Jewish
grave sites inside Israel. Furthermore, Israeli politicians have also sought to
shift responsibility for maintaining Gaza’s infrastructure and trade flows to
Egypt in order to abrogate Israeli responsibility for Gaza’s welfare and
economic conditions (McCarthy 2009).
Israel and Egypt have been able to assert their security interests by means
of applying superior military force to override the norm of sovereign inviol-
ability. This is in keeping with the phenomenon that Elden has termed
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“contingent sovereignty” (2009, 168–169). Israel’s use of political violence to
maintain its security regime over Gaza has included pervasive UAV and
electronic surveillance over Gaza’s atmosphere, carrying out targeted assassi-
nations by missile-strike on Palestinian militants, and shooting at Gazans
who approach maritime boundaries and the border fence inside Gaza.
Likewise, Gazan militant factions including the Al-Qassam Brigades,
Hamas’ military wing, and Islamic Jihad have carried out frequent rocket
and mortar attacks against Israeli towns and settlements in the Western
Negev, and have made several infiltrations into Israel’s pre-1967 borders by
both sea and tunnels to carry out attacks. Both sets of examples illustrate that
while Gaza’s territorial contents appear fixed in two dimensions, when
expanded to a three-dimensional volumetric conception of territory, the
ordering of space becomes far more permeable and precarious than the
Westphalian model can allow for.
For several decades, networks of tunnels branching underneath Gaza have
been the veins that have vitally sustained the enclave’s economic survival, as
well as its self-styled armed “resistance” to Israel. These tunnels can be
divided into three broad categories: cross-border smuggling tunnels from
Egypt, tactical tunnels within Gaza, and cross-border strategic attack tunnels
into Israel. However, as Cowen observes, “the distinction between ‘civilian’
and ‘military’” is highly precarious in the contemporary world, particularly in
relation to the violence implicit in the military origins and continuities of the
logistical techniques that enable the “pipelines of flow” through which goods
and bodies can elide the boundaries of the nation-state (2014, 4). Hamas’
tunnelling practices have evolved from the experience gained through the
earliest building of smuggling tunnels across the Philadelphia Corridor, a
14km long narrow buffer zone between southern Gaza and the Egyptian
border near Rafah, that has been ongoing for several years prior to Hamas’
establishment in 1987 (Pelham 2012, 7). These early tunnels were built to
smuggle cheap goods and to facilitate movement between the previously
contiguous community after the physical partition of the Sinai border in
1982. These tunnels continued to be used to counter movement restrictions
on people and goods through the 1990s and early 2000s. However, the nature
and roles of these tunnels have evolved significantly in the aftermath of
Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza.
In response to Hamas taking power in Gaza in 2007, Israel and Egypt both
imposed a comprehensive blockade restricting the movement of goods and
people entering or leaving the territory. Banned goods have included many
categories of food, clothing, household goods, cars and building materials
(BBC News 2010). Israel argues that the blockade is necessary to prevent
weapons being transferred to Hamas and other militant organisations oper-
ating in the strip from Syria and the Lebanese Shia movement Hezbollah in
the context of increased rocket attacks emanating from Gaza (Haaretz 2008).
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Egypt for its part has maintained the blockade because it views the Fatah-led
government as the legitimate Palestinian authority to control Gaza’s borders
alongside monitoring by European Union observers (Haaretz Service and
News Agencies 2014). However, the UN and human rights NGOs have called
the blockade “collective punishment” against Gaza’s population for support-
ing Hamas which they argue is a violation of international law in war (UN
News Centre 2012; Amnesty International 2010, 7). The blockade has vari-
ably eased and tightened over time in correlation with changing regional
dynamics. However, it has continued to remain in effect as a long-term
militarised governmental technique for managing security (Winter 2014,
316) despite the concerns raised by human rights advocates about its pro-
portionality, and indeed some Israeli security practitioners’ questioning of its
efficacy (Eiland 2017; Harel 2016b).
Since 2007, the Rafah tunnels have become an essential conduit for
importing food and banned goods into Gaza against the backdrop of wor-
sening humanitarian conditions (McCarthy 2009) Hamas has consolidated
authority over the cross-border tunnels, which are privately operated by
Palestinian families who pay a license fee to the regime. Hamas uses its
oversight of the tunnels to raise revenue by levying taxes on goods imported
through the tunnels, import fuel supplies, as well as to clandestinely transport
weapons into Gaza (Pelham 2012; Piven 2014; Verini 2014). This dual-use
arrangement has made the tunnels a crucial infrastructure in maintaining
Hamas’ viability as the political hegemon inside Gaza, both financially as a
source of income to sustain its government, and militarily as a logistical
conduit. However, in early 2013 the Egyptian military launched a crackdown
to seal the smuggling tunnels. This process intensified following the coup
d’état that overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohammed
Morsi.5 The Egyptian efforts to destroy the tunnels were in part designed to
quell the growing instability being perpetuated by Islamic State-affiliated
militant groups operating in the Sinai, which had instrumental links to the
Al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza at the time (Eldar 2015). In addition to the
environmental contamination of Gaza’s water supplies from the sewage and
seawater being pumped from the Egyptian side to collapse the tunnels, this
destruction had severe effects on Gaza’s economy (State of Palestine 2016,
20) and Hamas’ revenue stream.
Hamas has also used cross-border tunnels into Israel for both tactical and
strategic ends in several incidents prior to the 2014 war. These tunnels
specifically are the focus of this article’s empirical discussion. The most
significant cross-border tunnelling operation by Hamas was the 2006 kidnap-
ping of IDF sergeant Gilad Shalit from a border post near the Kerem Shalom
crossing. Shalit was used as a hostage with which to negotiate the release of
Palestinian prisoners from Israeli incarceration in 2011. This tactic of tunnel-
ling mobilises the elemental properties of subsurface soil to disrupt the
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contiguity of sovereign terrestrial space defined through the assemblage of
practices and infrastructures that delimit the state’s borders, such as patrols,
fences, walls and border-crossing installations. According to one Israeli (res.)
Major-General who was involved in strategic planning during the 2014 war:
“the attack tunnels [were] one of the most important challenges that we are
faced with because it threatens most military camps and of course civilian . . .
and near the borders [and] we don’t evacuate not military, not civilians from
the war area.”6
Hamas’ more recent military tunnels into Israel that played a role in the
2014 Gaza war were far more sophisticated than earlier tunnels, which were
quite shallow and crudely built. To thwart detection by Israeli forces Hamas
engineers started to build the tunnels at greater depths. To do so, they
reinforced these tunnels with concrete, a scarce commodity in Gaza due to
Israeli import restrictions. The IDF claim that approximately 800 tons of
concrete were used in the construction of the tunnels that it had discovered
(McCoy 2014). This material has either been diverted by Hamas from
documented building projects, was smuggled from Egypt via the Rafah
tunnels prior to 2013, or possibly stockpiled from a combination of sources
(Barnard and Rudoren 2014). Either way, clandestinely accumulating, storing
and deploying such a massive supply of concrete for the attack tunnels was
an onerous, expensive and well-coordinated enterprise. According to one
media report the “cost of excavating, reinforcing and maintaining each
tunnel [was] approximately $1 million” (Eldar 2014), which was a significant
expenditure for the cash-strapped Hamas government in the midst of a
humanitarian crisis. Following the 2014 conflict, there is evidence that
Hamas has been using concrete purchased through the black market at
above-market prices from supplies intended to rebuild Gaza’s heavily
damaged residential and public infrastructure (Khoury 2015).
The extensive resources directed towards building the tunnels indi-
cates that they are not built ad hoc for short-term tactical advantage, but
are long-term strategic assets to further Hamas’ political goals. The
tunnels are an attempt by Hamas to “level the playing field” by strate-
gically flanking the Israeli state’s security assemblages, and by extension
the Israeli state’s claim to sovereign control. The tunnels’ immanent
potential for facilitating a surprise attack requires Israel to take seriously
Hamas’ interests and demands to avoid the domestic and international
political consequences of an infiltration, or renewed conflict to incapa-
citate the tunnels. In this sense, the tunnels destabilise an understanding
of territory in which state security apparatuses can protect their citizenry
within the state’s territorial confines by pre-empting vectors of existen-
tial danger through holistic territorial knowledge and techniques. In
practical terms, this weakens the confidence of Israel’s political echelons
and security agents in their own abilities to exclude threats from without
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(Elden 2013b, 327–328), and in turn the Israeli citizenry’s faith in the
state’s ability to provide security.
This strategic purpose is reflected in the deliberate internal construction of
the tunnels’ infrastructure. These tunnels are on average approximately two
metres high by one metre across. These dimensions allow the movement of
people and munitions with relative ease. They contain lights, electricity and
in some cases tracks for transporting materiel, and are booby trapped with
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to hinder penetration. Furthermore,
their entrances and exits are camouflaged by brush, trapdoors inside build-
ings such as mosques and private homes, or are positioned within wadis to
evade detection. In keeping with the well-documented geographical critique
of the “gods-eye” view of aerial surveillance (Graham and Hewitt 2013;
Gregory 2011; Saint-Amour 2011; Shaw and Akhter 2012), these camou-
flaged tunnel openings are virtually impossible to detect by conventional
aerial imaging techniques, thus making ineffectual the UAVs used extensively
by the IDF to maintain surveillance over Gaza. Hamas’ deliberate practices to
evade surficial detection require that the IDF turn to complicated and
precarious geophysical sensing techniques to locate sub-surface incursions.
Subsurface Complexity and Political Agency
An elemental geopolitics requires a reconfiguring of our understanding of
war as a spatial phenomenon by accounting for the agentive role of the
materialities of rock and soil, and the military engineering practices that
either harness or are confounded by their properties. The Gaza tunnels have
become a political danger for Israel due to the convergence of a unique set of
human and physical factors becoming enrolled together in a specific place to
become a salient military assemblage. To produce the tunnels, both the
digging practices of Hamas and the earthly conditions of Gaza and the
Western Negev have become agents in the messy three-way political conflict
between Hamas, the PNA and Israel. Likewise, the area’s heterogeneous soil
types and chemical composition in conjunction with the specific depths at
which the tunnels transect, and the border practices and settlement patterns
of the area have made finding the tunnels a challenging techno-scientific
problem for Israel’s scientists, engineers and soldiers. It is precisely Hamas’
ability to capitalise on these limits of the scientific ability to know the density
of subterranean space that make the tunnels a political “matter of concern.”
In order understand the material relationship between soil composition
and the political-strategic issue of tunnel detection, or failure thereof, it is
first necessary to have an appreciation of the geophysics of seismic sensing
and electro-magnetic sensing techniques (Daniels 2004; Kearey, Brooks, and
Hill 2002; Ruffell and McKinley 2008, chapter 3). Several geophysical sensing
techniques are being experimented with for detection of the Gaza tunnels
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including classical seismic techniques using acoustic waves generated by a
sound source, ground penetrating RADAR (GPR) that uses radio waves and
frequency domain electro-magnetic mapping (FDEM) that measures the
variance in electromagnetic conductivity of different materials. Seismic tech-
niques and GPR are both similar in their basic principles. Waves, either sonic
or electro-magnetic, are projected from a source into the underground. The
waves then reflect off the subsurface materials. Data is collected by measuring
the time it takes a signal to bounce back from the source to the proximate
sensor at the surface level at a given point. Different surfaces reflect a
frequency back at different rates depending on their material properties.
This time/distance data is then converted and manipulated into a legible
representation of a cross-section of the earth.
A signal will be able to penetrate deeper, or will reflect more easily, based
on the density of a given sub-surface material. However, a trade-off must be
made between the depth of penetration and the resolution of the data
collected. Lower frequency wavelengths can penetrate more deeply beneath
the surface, but resolution decreases drastically at lower frequencies.7 FDEM
is somewhat different in that it uses a large and powerful electromagnet to
produce a signal and a sensor located on the apparatus measures distur-
bances in the sub-surface magnetic field.
In contrast to the earlier smuggling tunnels into Rafah from Egypt that
were typically from 10 to 12m deep, the more recent attack tunnels into Israel
at 20–30m depth are far more problematic. They exist below the depth of
approximately 10m that the high frequency electromagnetic waves used in
GPR are most effective, but well above the several kilometres of depth that
seismic techniques are typically used to detect large geological features. Also,
as previously mentioned, since the resolution decreases at greater depths,
lower frequency waves struggle to detect objects the size of the tunnels, which
are less than six feet tall by three feet wide. While FDEM can in some cases
produce resulting images of up to 50m depth, it is particularly susceptible to
interference from magnetic anomalies.8
Another source of frustration for tunnel detection experts is the heterogene-
ity in soil types, compositions and strata. Different techniques are better suited
to specific soil types, and each soil type presents its own set of challenges for
geo-sensing (Kuloglu and Chen 2010, 4314). As shown in Figure 1, beneath
Gaza are variegated layers of sand, clay, loess and rock both laterally and across,
as well as harder rocks imbedded in the soil which waves reflect back at
different times, complicating the process of gathering geophysical data.
Compounding this problem, the endemic soil contains a high saline content.9
As salt is hygroscopic, the soil contains numerous pockets of liquefied salt
which reflect electromagnetic waves back to the surface, often at oblique angles
from the signal source, producing anomalies that are detrimental to obtaining a
clear subterranean image. Yet another layer of frustration for rendering the
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subterranean expanse knowable is the amalgamation of discrete strata. Several
of the experts that I interviewed described the soil conditions at the Gaza border
as “disturbed.”10 This “disturbance” can be attributed to the historical condi-
tions of the area as a settlement hotspot for several millennia. The intensive
agricultural activity endemic to the area has contributed significantly to blend-
ing the natural soil layers, which disorients the locations of objects in the
geophysical images.
Sub-surface detection is further complicated by unwanted interference.
These artefacts occur largely as a result of patterns of settlement and
human activity in the border area. Vibrations from road traffic and
heavy farming equipment interfere with small-scale seismic techniques
that can best target the 20–30m depth range of the tunnels. Likewise,
GPR and FDEM are affected by fences and detritus in the ground that
produce anomalies due to electromagnetic conductivity. Paradoxically, the
interference generated by the extensive military activity and material
security infrastructure of fences, walls and communications posts along
the border in fact mitigates security from tunnels by interfering with the
capacities of detection technologies.
As this section demonstrates, technological efforts to render subterranean
territory knowable will remain for the foreseeable future a fraught, contin-
gent and inevitably incomplete project constrained by the material agencies
of local geological and geopolitical conditions. The elemental qualities of the
earth in concert with the patterns of human activity, and even the security
assemblages of the state itself, collectively generate a more-than-human
agency that has an inertial force against the security aims of the state to
Figure 1. Cross-section of soil layers in Rafah District, Southern Gaza.
Source: Zaineldeen et al. 2014, 4352.
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defend its self-defined territorial integrity. Following on from the technical
challenges of merely gathering accurate and useable geophysical sensor data,
there is a second problematique of how to cartographically represent this
data in a legible way. Since the opacity and density of soil requires sensing
outside of direct visual experience, novel forms of visualisation become
necessary that are dissociated from the intuitiveness of direct visual
perception.
A Cartography of the Unknowable
Collating and representing the data gathered from geophysical sensing will
always rely on multiple, contingent and incomplete ways of knowing and
visualising the subterranean volume. Once raw data is acquired it must be
processed into an image that is suitable for analysis. This time-consuming
process necessitates enhancing particular aspects of the data and organising it
as a diagrammatic output useable for analysis. Even at the final stage, analysis
of the processed data requires highly specialised expertise to make sense of
the underground cartography and to find relevant anomalies. Unlike a
photograph, which is a familiar and naturalised visual form that enables
quick interpretation, subterranean geophysical exploration requires highly
abstract forms of imaging. These techniques require knowing what object is
being sought in advance (for example, a fossil fuel deposit, an archaeological
site, or a tunnel), as well as specialist knowledge of what an anomaly will look
like when represented.11
At present, the specialist training and intensive computer-aided post-pro-
cessing that are necessary to make geophysical scans legible preclude the
possibility of a simple solution for tunnel detection that could be easily and
quickly operated by soldiers in the field. See for example the GPR scan shown
in Figure 2, used to investigate a suspected escape tunnel leading from a prison
in Northern Ireland, near the border with the Republic of Ireland, following
subsidence on a road adjacent to the facility.12
It would be very difficult to identify the features labeled in Figure 2(b)
extrapolated from the scan shown in Figure 2(a) without a high level of
training and expertise. Furthermore, even with this expertise, the representa-
tion such a scan can provide will always be incomplete and imperfect. Near the
bottom of the cross-section, below 5m depth, the image becomes noticeably
distorted, due to the high-frequency radio waves’ inability to penetrate at
greater depth. It should be noted that the target depth for this investigation
was from the 0m to 8m range, which is far shallower than the cross-border
tunnels from Gaza into Israel.
The endemic conditions of a particular area in conjunction with the
strengths and drawbacks of each exploratory technique necessitates the use
of a combination of methods to obtain a heuristically viable model of a
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location’s underground terrain. Several research participants suggested that
there is no simple “one-size fits all” solution to the tunnel problem that could
be easily applied without highly specialised scientific education. Rather,
successful detection in each place will require an ad hoc solution that
combines several geophysical techniques with other forms of knowledge
such as human and signals intelligence.13 Recently, Israeli forces have inter-
rogated several captured Hamas militants, including a 17-year-old, in order
to obtain intelligence on how the tunnels are being built and concealed
(Cohen 2016; Cohen and Ben Zikri 2016).
The subterranean layer presents a significant challenge for a totalising
political knowledge of territory by the state through cartographic representa-
tion. As expert 1 put it, finding these tunnels is “like searching for a needle in a
haystack [where] you need to separate valuable data from background noise.”
Instead of being able to directly visualise what lies below the surface through
intuitive forms of perception, the underground must be indirectly sensed
through technological means calibrated by an arduous process of trial and
error. The intensive time and resource allocation required for such a project is
at odds with a temporal and economic logic of security based on the quick and
efficient identification and targeting of threats. Whatever useable sensory data
that is eventually gathered must then be represented diagrammatically and
interpreted using knowledge that is contingent on highly specialised forms of
scientific expertise. Even then, successful tunnel identification is contingent on
the limitations imposed by the rules of physics and the actual capacities of
Figure 2. (a) GPR scan used in investigation of suspected prisoner escape tunnel in Northern
Ireland. (b) Expert interpretation of the above scan.
Source: Ruffell and McKinley 2008, 82.
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technologies at present. These limitations necessitate a shift towards abstract
forms of topological representation that are increasingly divorced from the
immediacy of direct visual perception of a phenomenon. Such knowledge is
not always accurate because it is predicated on reasonable conjecture from pre-
existing expectations about what should be found beneath the ground.14 This
opacity and reliance on supposition destabilises the confidence of state security
actors to identify with any certainty the potential security threats concealed
within the soil of the territory they are tasked with managing.
This uncertainty has profound implications for the calculation and antici-
pation of risk by the military. Despite expectations of politicians and the
public that technological solutions can provide anticipatory evidence of
threats, the present techniques of scanning, data modelling and mapping
cannot give the definite locations of cross-border tunnels. All of the scanning
techniques discussed in this article require “boots on the ground” to operate
large and unwieldy apparatuses in exposed areas in a conflict zone, making
the operators highly susceptible to attacks from infantry, snipers or ranged
munitions. Even then such efforts might not produce any actionable data,
despite the risks involved. Additionally, the amount of guesswork required by
experts in tunnel detection requires definitive action to be taken by combat
forces based on information that invariably comes with an increased prob-
ability of inaccuracy. Expert 2 explained the problem of neutralising the
tunnels in the 2014 war:
We don’t see where the objective starts, where it ends. . . this is the basic reference
you cannot make distinctions where the military objectives are so . . . this is
something that should change all the concepts that you . . . because you cannot
work without the basic layer of understanding [of] the enemy and you cannot
understand the enemy not by the objectives, the specific objective, and also not by
the intention, what he’s going to do. . . If we had a system that can take all the
relevant military camps and move them and also some people from the community
and move them for few weeks, it could have achieved much better results than
using very expensive measurements in order to detect where the [tunnels are].
The concealed nature of the tunnels makes it impossible for military planners
to even identify a basic space from which a threat will emanate. This makes it
difficult to ascertain the intended target or temporal frame of a threatening
action. This knowledge gap makes it near impossible to effectively direct
force towards a military objective. Complicating this matter is an under-
standing of the border area as a spatial container for people and objects that
must be protected. To create a calculable space in which targets can be
identified and military action can be effected, the sources/objects of risk
protection must be removed completely. Such a move would be an admission
of failure in the state’s ability to be able anticipate and secure its population
and resources from danger. This undercuts the very foundations of risk
management underlying contemporary state security practices.
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Amoore uses the case of the aftermath of another geo-physically imbri-
cated crisis, Italy’s 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, to argue that contemporary risk
logic demands that “nothing is incalculable” and that for experts and politi-
cians “to have available data – even if they are tangentially related, partial or
fragmentary – and to fail to infer across the gaps” is tantamount to negli-
gence (2014, 424). Such perceived negligence is likely to have severe political
repercussions. A commission of enquiry was carried out by the Israeli State
Comptroller’s office in response to criticism in the Knesset of the security
cabinet and military brass’ handling of the tunnels in the 2014 war (The State
Comptroller of Israel 2017). The report excoriated Prime Minister Benyamin
Netenyahu and former defense minister Moshe Ya’alon for failing to act on
intelligence about the immediacy of the threat posed by the tunnels and for
failing to share relevant information with the full security cabinet (Jerusalem
Post Staff 2016). It points to a previous report on the potential for tunnel
attacks from 2007 to demonstrate the availability of adequate intelligence to
allow decisive action and to show that warnings about ‘the necessity of
oversight and even intervention by the political leadership’ had been made
clear prior to 2014 (Bob 2016). According to one former defense industry
executive who consulted on the 2007 report, possible pathways for techno-
logical solutions were proposed including a ‘sensor net’ several kilometres in
area that could detect and locate underground vibrations from the digging of
tunnels. However, he believed that no action was taken at the time due to
“political decisions” and competing budgetary priorities within Israel’s
Ministry of Defense.15 While the risk for a tunnel attack was conceivable
based on available intelligence and conjecture from Hamas’ past use of
tunnels, the occlusive properties of the subsurface interfered with the pre-
sentation of directly verifiable and incontrovertible evidence of an imminent
threat. This uncertainty gave the political leadership the option to ignore the
tunnels risk to pursue other avenues of political interest, until that risk has
materialised and rebounded, leading to accusations of negligence or even
wilful manipulation at the expense of Israel’s national security. Put simply,
this example illustrates how the materiality of the subterranean make the
technical political, and vice-versa.
Conclusions
The Israeli response to the Gaza tunnels is a particularly illustrative case of
how human political activity is inextricable from the vicissitudes of the
materialities and physical properties of the environment. This hybrid agency
comes from the endemic convergence of the material practices of bordering
and tunnelling, discourses of security and danger and the elemental
processes of the subterranean. Whilst it would be an overstatement to
suggest that the following are causes of the Gaza-Israel conflict, the soil
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composition, settlement patterns, architectural practices and infrastructure of
Gaza-Western Negev all contribute in intricate and entangled ways to the
tactical, strategic and geopolitical dynamics of the ongoing Gaza-Israel con-
flict. This complex amalgamation suggests that to better understand the
geopolitical as a material-earthly process, geographers need to grapple with
the unique vectors of difference endemic to the subsurface volume in a given
place. These vectors might include local conditions of elemental chemistry,
material practices and human political contexts, alongside broader categori-
cal conceptualisations of elemental materialities in terms of air, sea, rock, soil.
The dynamics of the relations between human activities that alter the
geophysical and the elemental forces of the underground make palpable the
limits of techno-scientific capacities to obtain certain cartographic knowledge
of the subterranean. The contingent nature of state sovereignty in relation to
an elemental inertia of a dense and heterogeneous soil that defies attempts to
bring it “to account” (Adey 2015, 55) necessitates constant work by state
scientific, military and intelligence actors to secure sub-surface territory
through increasingly complex and fractional materialities, practices and dis-
courses. This provokes a “cartographic anxiety” over “the desire to make
geographical space legible” and thus calculable. The subterranean “unknown”
must be drawn “into the ambit of Reason” otherwise it will aggravate an
epistemological crisis that threatens the intrinsic logical foundation of terri-
tory as the geographical manifestation of state power (Painter 2008, 346). To
assuage this crisis, the cartographic inscrutability of the subsurface must be
overcome by the state. This necessitates innovating new ways of obtaining
geographical knowledge that are tailored to the specific conditions of the
terrain, and can synthesise fragments of partial knowledge to produce at least
a crude epistemology of underground space. However, the limited adequacy
of these spatial knowledge, and the increasingly indirect forms of representa-
tion being generated to visualise them, greatly diminishes the abilities of state
authorities to accurately forecast and manage security risks. The soil’s ability
to obfuscate techniques through which data can be gathered, analysed and
used to predict future threats profoundly alters the calculus through which
the political logic of risk operates in a fundamental way. An inability to
anticipate risk at the foundational level of territory undermines the authority
of the state in the eyes of both its citizens and its adversaries, and thus
destabilises its legitimacy as the sole provider of existential security. This
unsettling of political order begs the question of to what extent can techno-
logical solutions effectively manage the epistemic lacuna precipitated by the
enrolment of the material agency of the earth by contending forces?
Answering this question requires a critical evaluation of how techno-scien-
tific knowledge, practices and tools are enrolled in the project of securing
territory when confronted with the ambivalent elemental agencies of the
subsurface.
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Notes
1. Hamas is an Arabic acronym for Harakat al-Muqawwma al-Islamiyya, which translates
in English as Islamic Resistance Movement (Caridi 2012, 36).
2. Expert Interview 1, Geographer specialising in remote sensing at an Israeli university,
March 2016.
3. For criticism of the power relations of Israeli infrastructural control from radical
Palestinian perspectives see Salamanca (2011) and Tawil-Souri (2012).
4. Further to my explanation in the previous paragraph, the present article deliberately
does not address the territorial disputes over Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Golan
Heights in any detail. This is because each of these locations has a distinct spatio-
political logic that goes beyond the localised focus of the present research on the Gaza-
Israel border region.
5. The Muslim Brotherhood is an ideological sibling organisation to Hamas, which was
founded as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, although more recently
they have severed formal ties.
6. Expert interview 2, IDF Maj. General (res.) involved in strategic planning of 2014 Gaza
war, March 2016.
7. Expert Interview 3, Engineer specialising in seismic detection at Geophysical Institute
of Israel, April 2016; Expert Interview 4, Engineer specialising in GPR and FDEM at an
Israeli university, April 2016; Expert Interview 5, Engineer specialising in seismic
detection at an Israeli university, April 2016.
8. Expert Interview 4.
9. Expert interview 4.
10. Expert interviews 3 and 4.
11. Expert interviews 1, 4 and 5.
12. I was unable to obtain actual scans of the Israel-Gaza border for inclusion in this
publication due to issues with participant confidentiality and state secrecy require-
ments. However, the scan in Figure 2 is comparable in type to test scans that were
shown to me by expert interviewee 5. Further investigation of the anomaly identified in
Figure 2(b) determined that a rotting tree stump caused the road to subside, and that
the suspected tunnel did not exist (Ruffel and McKinley 2008, 81–83).
13. Expert interview 1; see also Kuloglu and Chen (2010, 4314).
14. Expert interview 5.
15. Expert interview 6, retired executive from a prominent Israeli defense company, March
2016.
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